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Abstract
Objective. To analyse safety risks in injectable medications. To assess the potential impact and pharmacoeconomic aspects of
safety tools.
Design. The injectable drug process was prospectively assessed using a failure modes, effects and criticality analysis. Criticality
indexes were estimated based on their likelihood of occurrence, detection probability and potential severity. The impact of 10
safety tools on the criticality index was calculated and extrapolated to all drugs injected daily. Yearly costs for a reduction in
criticality by 1 point (¼1 quali) per day were estimated.
Setting. Paediatric and neonatal intensive care units in a University Hospital.
Participants. Two paediatric nurses, a neonatologist, three hospital pharmacists.
Interventions. Qualitative and quantitative risk assessment.
Main Outcome Measures. Failure modes, criticality indexes, cost-efﬁcacy ratios.
Results. Thirty-one failure modes identiﬁed, with the mean of their entire criticality indexes totalling 4540. The most critical
failure mode was microbial contamination. The following gains were predicted: 1292 quali (46 500 per day by extrapolation)
from ready-to-use syringes, 1201 (72 060) by employing a clinical pharmacist, 996 (59 780) from double check by nurses and
984 (59 040) with computerized physician order entry. The best cost-efﬁcacy ratios were obtained for a clinical pharmacist
(1 quali ¼ 0.54 euros), double check (1 quali ¼ 0.71 euros) and ready-to-use syringes (1 quali ¼ 0.72 euros). Computerized
physician order entry showed the worst cost-efﬁcacy ratio due to a very high investment costs (1 quali ¼ 22.47 euros).
Conclusion. Based on our risk and pharmacoeconomic analyses, clinical pharmacy and ready-to-use syringes appear as the
most promising safety tools.
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Introduction
Medication errors are causing signiﬁcant harm to hospitalized
patients with high economic implications; the risk is particu-
larly high in intensive care units [1]. Although medication
errors and adverse drug events (ADEs) have received substan-
tial attention in adults, relatively few published reports have
addressed this issue in children. Information on paediatric
medication use, particularly in neonates, is often lacking [2].
Paediatric patients need weight-based dosing, which necessi-
tates more calculations than for adults [3]. In addition, the
range of licensed medications in appropriate dosage forms is
limited, thus often requiring complex dose and dilution calcu-
lations before administration. Previous studies have identiﬁed
an error rate of 13–84% in hospitals when preparing and
administering intravenous drugs to infants and children [4–6].
Dose calculations are a common contributor to medication
errors, with a factor 10 error being among the most common
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[7]. In a 6-week prospective study in two university paediatric
institutions, Kaushal et al. [8] found that medication errors
occurred for 5.7% of prescriptions. Although the preventable
ADEs rate was similar to that found in adult inpatients, errors
with the potential to cause harm were three times more likely
to occur in paediatric inpatients.
Awareness is growing that prospective risk analysis
approaches as used in a number of high hazard industries need
to be applied to health care [9, 10]. Among other methods, the
‘failure modes, effects and criticality analysis’ (FMECA) is a
well-described tool to systematically assess a process. It ident-
iﬁes possible or likely errors (‘failure modes’), and gauges what
their effect may be even before they take place [11]. FMECA
includes a quantitative evaluation of the criticality of each failure
mode, and compares the top critical events in different process
organizations, allowing a simple estimation of the impact of
new tools on patient safety even before their implementation.
The objectives of the current study were to perform a
prospective risk analysis to quantitatively evaluate the safety
of the current injectable medication process in the paediatric
and neonatal intensive care units (PICU and NICU) of our
University Hospital, with a special focus on the preparation
and administration steps. We compared the potential impact
of 10 safety tools on risk of ADEs and also classiﬁed these
tools using pharmacoeconomic criteria.
Method
Setting
The study was based on the activity of the PICU (10 beds)
and the NICU (15 beds) of the Geneva University Hospitals
(2000 beds).
Current injectable medication process in the PICU and NICU. At
the time of analysis, prescriptions were handwritten by the
medical staff. Drug dispensing was performed by nurses
from a ward stock, the stock being reﬁlled by global orders
to the central pharmacy. Nursing staff transcribed the orders
to the nurse care plan and selected the drug from the ward
stock for preparation and administration. No horizontal
laminar ﬂow hood (HFLA) was used for the preparation, but
parenteral nutrition and some other drugs were compounded
at the pharmacy. The name of the drug, the ﬂow rate and
the concentration of the solution were written on a sticky
label for the prepared injectable. No systematic double check
of the preparation (calculation, drugs used, dilution) was
performed by a second nurse. Injectables were administered
using syringe or volumetric pumps. No in-line ﬁlters were
used with infusion lines. There was no clinical pharmacist
integrated in any units but regular visits were organized by a
pharmacist to discuss problems of preparation and
administration of drugs with nurses.
In the meantime, a computerized physician order entry
(CPOE) named Clinisoftw and including clinical decision-
support systems like monitoring of vital functions, infor-
mation on drugs, patient history, laboratory and radiology
results has been implemented.
Design
A FMECA was performed by a multidisciplinary team (two
specialized nurses, a neonatologist and three hospital phar-
macists) [12]. The analysis focused on the entire medication
process of injectables, from prescription to administration,
with a special attention to preparation and administration
steps.
FMECA risk analysis. A brainstorming strategy was used to
determine all possible ways the injectable medication process
might fail. Each team member had to write down all risks
and possible failures they could envisage. These suggestions
were then assembled and organized during a common
discussion to become the failure modes. An Ishikawa’s
diagram was built to organize them step by step (Fig. 1).
Three frequently used drugs with different characteristics
were chosen as models for injectables: gentamicin for anti-
biotics and other common injectables; morphine for analge-
sics and narcotics; dopamine for vasoactive and monitored
drugs. The likelihood of occurrence of each failure mode for
each model drug was classiﬁed from 1 to 10, the severity of
the potential effect for the patient from 1 to 9 and the prob-
ability to detect the failure from 1 to 9. The evaluation was
carried out according to standardized tables, taking care to
remain coherent in ranking similar events [12]. Scores were
obtained by consensual quotation in the team. In particular,
occurrence was supported by data from the systematic critical
incident reporting of the two ICUs. The criticality index of
each failure mode was calculated by multiplying the fre-
quency, severity and detection scores, yielding a minimum of
1 and a maximum of 810. The top 10 critical failure modes
were determined by ranking the mean criticality indexes of
the three model drugs.
Ten tools to improve safety were chosen empirically
(Table 1). Their potential beneﬁt on the criticality indexes of
the three model drugs was again assessed by the FMECA
method.
The term ‘quali’ (plural: quali) was created to allow a con-
venient transposition from the notion of criticality to the
quality gain in the medication process. One quali was deﬁned
as a reduction of the criticality index by one point. Quali for
the top 10 critical failure modes were compared between the
different safety tools analysed.
Generalization for economic estimate. As required in economic
analyses, an extrapolation to the use of all daily injectable
drugs was performed for each safety improvement tool (see
Table 1), using data compiled during a large survey performed
during the year 2003 in the same units [13]. On average, 7
patients with 8 drugs per day were hospitalized in the PICU
and 14 patients with 3 drugs in the NICU (overall a total of
98 drugs per day). About 60 drugs were used as injectables.
Cost analysis. Cost analysis was performed from a hospital
perspective. The required investment in euros per year was
calculated for each tool (at the time of publication: 1 euro ¼
1.50 CHF ¼ 1.43 USD ¼ 130.90 JPY). Only direct costs
were considered. Only medical supplies such as syringes,
needles, in-line ﬁlters, face masks, etc. were taken into account
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for simple additional measures of asepsis, intermediate
dilution, in-line ﬁlters and vials of dilution. Additional human
resources were necessary for double check by nurses and
clinical pharmacist. The nurse’s double-checking time at each
potential failure point was estimated at 20 s [14]. The total
time for all injectable drug checks was converted into euros
using the local wages scale (100% salary for nurse with
intermediate level of experience ¼ 45 000 euros per year).
The daily time requirements for a clinical pharmacist for both
units were estimated to 50% (half-salary for pharmacist with
intermediate level of experience ¼ 40 000 euros per year).
The tasks considered for the clinical pharmacist were (i) to
check the correct use of drugs by nurses through speciﬁc
though not systematic interventions concerning preparation
(respect of concentration; of solvent; etc.) and administration
(detection of physicochemical incompatibilities; check the
ﬂow rate according to concentration of the solution, etc.) and
(ii) audits of the drugs stock (organization; fridge, etc.). For
the CPOE, initial investment costs and maintenance costs
during 1 year were estimated at 1 million euro and 300 000
euros, respectively. The estimations of initial investment and
maintenance costs have been provided by the head of medical
informatics’ team of the hospital. These costs are speciﬁc for
a system to be used in the intensive care environment (adults
and children), but cover the whole cost of the electronic
patient record (not only the CPOE). For HFLA, the estimated
costs included an initial investment plus the cost of aseptic
preparations in the units. We estimated that 15 drugs could be
provided in ready-to-use syringes (CIVAS), and we calculated
the costs of development (3620 euros by drug), as well as
their production cost (1.21 euros per syringe), based on our
previous experience. The drug planner induced no costs [15].
Cost-efﬁcacy analysis. The cost in euros required for an
improvement of one quali per day was calculated for each
safety improvement tool by dividing the investment per year
by all yearly quali (extrapolation from all daily injected drugs).
Sensitivity analysis. A sensitivity analysis was performed to
evaluate the inﬂuence of variations in estimated parameters
on total costs (Table 1).
Results
The medication process of injectables was split up into
ﬁve major steps, prescription, transcription, preparation,
administration and storage. A total of 31 failure modes were
determined during the brainstorming sessions (Fig. 1).
Figure 1 The Ishikawa’s diagram illustrating the ﬁve steps of the medication process with their associated failure modes.
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FMECA risk analysis
The criticality indexes calculated from the frequency, severity
and detection scores estimated by the team for each failure
mode are summarized in Table 2. The average sum of all criti-
cality indexes was 4540. Among the model drugs, gentamicin
totalized the greatest sum of criticality index, followed by mor-
phine and dopamine. The most critical failure mode (mean cri-
ticality index ¼ 432) was microbial contamination during the
preparation of medicines. The top 10 critical failure modes
concerned mainly preparation (5 failure modes), followed by
administration (4) and transcription (1). Top failure modes for
preparation were microbial contamination (432), dosage errors
(343), dilution errors (312), labelling errors (224) and selection
errors (171). Top failure modes for administration were phys-
icochemical incompatibilities (330), wrong ﬂow rate (317),
selection error (208) and drug given twice (194). The failure
mode during transcription was poor writing and reading (235).
Generalization for economic estimate
In a total of 4540 criticality points averaged between the
model drugs (272 400 criticality indexes per day by extrapol-
ation), we expected to gain 1292 quali (46 500) with CIVAS,
1201 (72 060) with a clinical pharmacist, 996 (59 780) with
double check by nurses, 984 (59 040) with CPOE, 555
(23 296) with in-line ﬁlters, 457 (12 348) with vial of dilution,
408 (17 122) with HFLA, 170 (4590) with intermediate
dilution, 144 (6192) with simple additional measures of
asepsis and 98 (951) with the drug planner.
The differences in quali of each safety tool for the top 10
critical failure modes are shown in Fig. 2. For the most
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Table 1 The 10 safety tools, their associated costs, the percentage of injectable drugs injected daily affected by each safety
tool, the extrapolated number used to multiply mean criticality index, and the parameters for sensitivity analysis, together
with their estimated variation






















Human resources 100% 60 +5 s spent for a check
Clinical pharmacist Human resources 100% 60 +10 years of
experience
Ready-to-use syringes Development &
production costs
60% could be prepared
as ready-to-use syringes
36 +0.31 euros on price
of a syringe (R & D)
Vial of dilution Medical supplies 45% concerned by a
withdrawal of a small
volume (,0.5 ml)
27 +0.42 euros on price
of a vial
Intermediate dilutions Medical supplies 45% concerned by a
withdrawal of a small
volume (,0.5 ml)
27 No variation
In-line ﬁlters Medical supplies 70% administered via a
central line
42 +2 in-line ﬁlters used
by day (ﬁlters blocked;




Medical supplies 72% not ready-to-use 42 No variation
Horizontal laminar




72% not ready-to-use 42 27236 euros on mean
cost per year ¼ initial
investments written off
after 5 years
Drug planner No costs 16% administered at
unusual dosing interval
(e.g. every 18 h)
10 free
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critical failure mode, i.e. microbial contamination, ﬁve safety
tools allowed a gain in quali. The greatest improvement of
384 quali was obtained with CIVAS whereas intermediate
dilution was associated with a loss of quali (272). Six safety
tools gained quali for the second most critical failure mode,
dosage errors during preparation. For the third most critical
failure mode, the wrong ﬂow rate, almost none of the pro-
posed tools allowed a signiﬁcant safety improvement.
Cost-efficacy ratio
Cost in euros per year and associated gain in quali for each
tool are represented in Fig. 3. The 10 tools are laid out in four
quadrants, according to yearly costs gained per quali and total
quali gained. Intervals were calculated with the sensitivity
analysis. The best cost-efﬁcacy ratio were obtained for a clini-
cal pharmacist (1 quali ¼ 0.54 euros), for double check by
nurses (1 quali ¼ 0.71 euros) and for CIVAS (1 quali ¼ 0.72
euros). The CPOE showed the worst cost-efﬁcacy ratio due to
the very high investment costs (1 quali ¼ 22.47 euros).
Discussion
Our work conﬁrms that FMECA is a feasible tool for a
proactive assessment of the injectable medication process in
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Table 2 Failure modes and criticality indexes for the model drugs (top 10 of failure modes in grey)
Failure modes During the study
Gentamicin Morphine Dopamine Mean
criticality
index
Prescription Dosage error 245 105 48 133
Prescription omitted 126 54 18 66
Transcription Prescription omitted to be transcribed 105 12 9 42
Poor writing and reading 224 224 256 235
Stop order omitted 60 40 16 39
Preparation Error of writing on the preparation card stuck on the pumps 126 126 144 132
Wrong selection between two different drugs (sound-alike,
look-alike, etc.)
160 7 48 72
Wrong selection between several dosages or salts of a drug 252 252 8 171
Wrong selection of the solvent of reconstitution or dilution 162 81 96 113
Microbial contamination 432 432 432 432
Preparation of a drug forgotten 245 24 18 96
Dosage error 343 294 392 343
Dilution error 336 216 384 312
Error of calculation of the patient’s parameters 168 120 120 136
Error in labelling of a prepared drug 192 224 256 224
Precipitation (high concentration) 72 35 35 47
Chemical degradation of drugs in a mixed preparation 108 105 56 90
Inaccuracy of small volumes withdrawal 45 60 108 71
Administration Pump doesn’t work 56 48 72 59
Wrong ﬂow rate 343 294 315 317
Physicochemical incompatibilities 336 360 294 330
Drug given twice 392 126 64 194
Wrong administration time 378 72 56 169
Wrong selection between two different drugs (sound-alike,
look-alike, etc.)
96 56 32 61
Wrong selection between several dosages or salts of a drug 336 280 8 208
Wrong route of administration 28 28 70 42
Wrong injection site 56 28 98 61
Wrong patient 196 196 80 157
Air introduced in central intravenous tubing 48 64 192 101
Air introduced in peripheral intravenous tubing 24 32 96 51
Storage Storage (protection for light, temperature control of drugs,
expiry date)
48 30 36 38
Total 5738 4025 3857 4540
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the PICU and NICU, even before the occurrence of
adverse events. As most medication errors are multi-
factorial, an FMECA was particularly useful in that it
allowed consideration of the global medication process.
Such errors are difﬁcult to study and FMECA is a novel
approach to predict the most cost-effective interventions.
Figure 2 Top 10 of failures modes and comparative gain or loss of quali for each safety tool (mean CI ¼ mean criticality index).
Figure 3 The 10 safety tools are laid out in four quadrants, according to yearly costs to gain 1 quali per day and total quali
gained per day. Intervals were calculated with a sensitivity analysis.
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These would then need to be tested and measured in
PICUs and NICUs.
Unlike other reports, we voluntarily did not focus exclu-
sively on prescriptions by examining also the preparation and
administration steps, which are seldom investigated in the lit-
erature [16]. Prot et al. [17] for instance analysed and classi-
ﬁed drug administration errors but did not include errors
occurring during the preparation step. However, such speciﬁ-
cation appears to make sense, since errors at the adminis-
tration stage have been found to be the most common ones
in paediatric patients [18].
In our current work, microbiological contamination during
preparation was the most critical failure mode. A similar
result was found in a recently published large multi-centre
audit of six European hospital departments [19]. Aseptic
procedures required for the safe preparation of intravenous
drugs were frequently violated by staff, often unaware of the
potential harm. CIVAS offer a safe alternative to reduce
microbiological contamination and dilution errors and avoid
drug wastage. An earlier development of ready-to-use vanco-
mycin syringes for our NICU was very satisfying [20]. HFLA
alone was unable to signiﬁcantly reduce risks of microbiolo-
gical contamination as it requires qualiﬁed operators, standar-
dized protocols and a quality control procedure to be
efﬁcient.
The difﬁculties encountered when preparing infusions
from concentrated stock solutions in intensive care units are
highlighted in the literature [21, 22]. To further improve
preparation in paediatrics, the most critical step in this
FMECA, we have begun studying the safest procedure with
the best accuracy for solutions prepared by three different
techniques: (i) small volumes withdrawn as currently, (ii)
intermediate dilutions and (iii) standardized vials of dilution.
The most cost-effective way of reducing the criticality of
injectable drugs was expected for a clinical pharmacist in the
NICU and PICU. Physicochemical incompatibilities during
administration were one of the most critical failure modes,
and its improvement was worthy of note. Our results agree
with numerous publications demonstrating the beneﬁt of a
paediatric clinical pharmacist, particularly in the prescription
step [23, 24]. One study reported savings of $9135 per year
in a 10-bed PICU of a university-afﬁliated children’s hospital
[25].
The use of in-line ﬁlters was proposed in order to reduce
microbiological contamination of injectable medications, but
there is no convincing evidence so far of their efﬁciency in
preventing catheter-related infections [26]. The advantages of
such devices are a reported reduction of phlebitis, and the
elimination of air, ﬁltration of particulate contaminants and
drugs precipitates. The fact that in-line ﬁlters cannot be used
with colloids and blood and may complicate drug adminis-
tration by adsorption and are expensive has to be considered
in the cost-efﬁcacy analysis [27].
Some drugs with uneven administration times, such as
gentamicin, are particularly prone to wrong administration
times. To avoid errors in the calculation of the correct
administration time, a drug planner giving the time of next
injection based on the last injection may be used [15]. This
simple tool can be used for all drugs with uneven injected
times. Although the impact of this tool is limited, its cost is
virtually zero.
CPOE improved a considerable number of failure modes,
but at high relative costs. A number of publications advocate
the positive impact of a CPOE on drug prescription and
administration safety in paediatric inpatients [28, 29].
However, CPOE for paediatric drug management may also
introduce new errors unseen with the previous paper pre-
scription [30]. Han et al. [31] even reported an increase in
mortality from 2.8 to 6.6% in a paediatric referral centre
after implementation of a commercially available CPOE
system. This unexpected result was only partially attributable
to the new prescription tool itself, and was associated with
major changes in the organization processes. Such contradic-
tory results highlight the difﬁculty of a successful implemen-
tation of a CPOE, no doubt inﬂuenced by the quality and
the exhaustiveness of the program itself, but also by numer-
ous technical, organizational, cultural and human factors.
CPOEs are often included in more complete electronic
patient record systems, and their high costs may be justiﬁable
as their advantages extend well beyond the speciﬁc safety
issues of injectable drugs.
Overall, the two major interests of an FMECA are its
simple application and the quantitative character of the evalu-
ation made possible by combining three complementary
factors. The evaluation is easy to perform and not too time-
consuming. A FMECA is therefore very helpful to decide
and prioritize actions to be taken. Moreover the active brain-
storming and discussion necessary to ﬁnd consensual bench-
marks contribute to the development of a very clear and
shared vision of the process organization, accounting for all
the different perspectives. The structured analysis allows con-
structive, objective and respectful discussions. Team
members noticed that they gained extensive comprehension
on each other’s constraints.
The major limitation of FMECA is an unavoidable subjec-
tivity component. As the team becomes larger and multidis-
ciplinary this bias is minimized. In the current study, we
obtained consensual benchmarks between all members of
the team, thus guaranteeing the highest possible objectivity.
To further limit variability, the scores were based on explicit
criteria published earlier [12]. It should be noted that the
speciﬁc mark found for a failure mode is not an essential
result, as the main goal is to rank risks and compare orders
of magnitude. A further limitation is that it is impossible to
assess the impact of a combination of multiple failures on a
speciﬁc outcome. However, the separate analysis of each
failure mode is also an advantage as it leads to a deeper
understanding of the risk associated to each step, thus allow-
ing targeted improvements. The FMECA method has not
been fully validated but is recommended by the Institute for
Healthcare Improvement [32].
Our results on criticality of injectable medication are
speciﬁc to our local situation. Conclusions may not be
directly applicable to the injectable medication process in
every PICU. However, the impact of some safety tools on
the criticality can easily be generalized. Most of the reported
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failure modes also concern other institutions and our data
appear as a good starting point to locally repeat a similar
evaluation of the medication process.
Conclusion
The use of a prospective risk analysis such as FMECA has
allowed a quantitative evaluation of the safety of paediatric
patients in connection with the injectable medication process.
The FMECA allowed generating tools for continuous safety
improvement by modelling the relative safety gain for speciﬁc
tools or new developments. Based on a pharmacoeconomic
analysis in our local setting, the involvement of a clinical phar-
macist and the introduction of ready-to-use syringes for selected
drugs have been shown to be the most cost-effective tool.
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